During 1992-2007, suppliers financed almost 10% of the total assets of U.S. listed firms. Prior academic literature suggests different arguments to explain this usage of trade credit by credit-rationed firms, but little is known about the motives underlying the use of trade credit by financially unconstrained firms. By arguing that trade credit usage provides valuable information to outside investors, this study derives a theoretical model that predicts a positive correlation between the intensity of trade credit use and the quality of the firm's investment decisions. This positive correlation strengthens when the firm (1) suffers from poor corporate governance structures, (2) is opaque, and (3) is managed by a CEO who is economically motivated to maximize shareholder wealth. The predictions receive empirical verification from a large sample of U.S. firms when both the change in Z-score and long-run abnormal returns serve as proxies for the quality of firm investment projects.
Introduction
Trade credit is a major source of financing in modern economies. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that trade credit (which they estimated using accounts payable) amounted to 15% of total assets in 1991 for a large sample of non-financial, listed U.S. firms (comparable figures have been reported for Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada). In the sample developed for this study, which contains 7,801 firm-year observations of non-financial, U.S., listed firms between 1992 and 2007, trade credit represents an average of 8.22% of total assets. This generalized use of trade credit is puzzling, because trade credit is very expensive by any standard. Its implicit cost involves the renounced rebate for cash payments that the firm suffers to benefit from payment delays. Fabbri and Menichini (forthcoming) report that the classic "2/10 net 30" agreement (i.e., a 2% discount for payment within 10 days, with net price charged for payment within 30 days) amounts to an implicit interest rate of more than 40% for those who do not take the discount. Why do firms use such an expensive source of financing so much?
To explain the reliance on trade credit, prior literature offers both non-financial and financial theories. In general, non-financial theories argue that trade credit allows for price discrimination (Brennan et al., 1988) , serves as a warranty for product quality (Long et al., 1993) , and fosters longterm relationships with customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002) . However these traditional theories cannot explain how borrowing constraints (or credit rationing) affect the demand for trade credit.
Therefore, using financial arguments, Biais and Gollier (1997) propose a signaling model in which suppliers screen borrowers, because they have a monitoring advantage over banks, and thereby mitigate credit rationing. Burkart and Ellingsen (1994) also assume the supplier has an informational advantage over banks, but this advantage applies exclusively to input transactions. These financial theories are consistent with some findings reported in empirical literature.
Specifically, previous empirical work shows that trade credit relates to the borrower's performance and financial health. Petersen and Rajan (1997) document that small firms use more trade credit when credit from financial institutions is unavailable, and Nilsen (2002) reports that small and large firms without access to open credit markets increase their trade credit usage during monetary
contractions. Yet some empirical evidence also suggests that non-rationed firms rely on trade credit.
For example, according to Petersen and Rajan (1997) large firms (which are less likely to be creditrationed than are small firms) rely more heavily on trade credit than do small firms. Therefore, an explanation of trade credit usage that is based solely on credit rationing is at best partial; in particular, it cannot explain the use of trade credit by non-rationed firms.
Fabbri and Menichini (forthcoming) therefore have proposed another financial theory to complement Biais and Gollier's (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen's (2004) theoretical contributions.
Their model includes collateralized bank and trade credit to explain the use of trade credit by financially unconstrained firms. Within their framework, suppliers have both monitoring and liquidation advantages in terms of providing finance, such that healthy firms can benefit from the liquidation advantage of their supplier.
We propose another alternative financial explanation for the use of trade credit by (non-rationed) firms: For shareholder value-maximizing managers (borrowers), the illiquid nature of inputs from suppliers, compared with cash financing from banks, creates an opportunity to distinguish themselves from self-interested managers. In this sense, trade credit use by (the managers of) financially unconstrained firms provides valuable information to outside investors about the quality of the firm's investments. 1 To test this proposition, we derive a theoretical model that predicts a positive correlation between the intensity of trade credit use and the quality of firm investment projects. We test the model predictions empirically with a large sample of listed U.S. firms. We use both the change in the Z-score of the firm and its long-term abnormal returns as proxies of the quality of the firm's investments.
Our analysis begins with a theoretical investigation of managerial behavior within the setup of a strategic game with imperfect information. We characterize managers by the emphasis they place on shareholder wealth maximization rather than private benefits. This managerial attribute is private information and a source of information asymmetry for external investors. Managers choose between two investment technologies and two financing sources. The first investment technology maximizes 1 Managers have more information about the quality of their firm investment projects than do outsiders, as noted by an article in Individual Investor cited by Lakonishok and Lee (2001, p. 79) : "Company executives and directors know their business more intimately than any Wall Street analyst ever would. They know when a new product is flying out the door, when inventories are piling up, whether profit margins are expanding or whether production costs are rising […] ." the value creation but leaves no room for private benefits; the second investment technology creates less value but provides managers the opportunity to divert a fraction of firm inputs for their own benefit, depending on the financing mode. The two sources of financing are trade credit and bank loans. Suppliers provide perfectly illiquid inputs, whereas banks supply cash, a perfectly liquid input by definition. Both investment technologies generate enough value to reimburse input providers, so we assume no bankruptcy risk and no reason for suppliers or banks to constrain firm financing. The firm's initial market value is a positive function of existing governance mechanisms (see Gompers et al., 2003 ) and a negative function of firm opacity (see Easley and O'Hara, 2004) .
In the Nash equilibrium of the game, managers that focus on value creation choose the investment technology that maximizes firm value and finance the firm investment with trade credit. Selfinterested managers choose the less value-creating investment technology, finance firm activities with bank loans, and take private benefits. The equilibrium behavior of agents creates the correlation between investment choices and financing sources and leads to interesting empirical predictions: Firm quality and trade credit financing should be positively correlated; the higher the manager's incentives to maximize the firm value, the stronger is the positive correlation between firm quality and trade credit; the weaker the firm governance mechanisms, the stronger should be the positive correlation between firm quality and trade credit; and the more the firm is opaque to outside investors, the stronger is the positive correlation between firm quality and trade credit.
We then provide an empirical test of these four predictions, which creates three main difficulties:
Investment choices are not directly observable, trade credit usage has a known industry pattern (see Petersen and Rajan, 1997) 2 that is unrelated to manager decisions, and trade credit use could be a consequence of poor financial health (firms are unable to pay their debts) or credit rationing by banks.
Our empirical framework can address these issues, as follows:
-Unlike prior empirical analyses of trade credit use, which rely on sample firms from the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) database of small businesses (e.g., 2 Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that the average ratio of accounts payable to sales varies from 2.7% for services to 7.0% for wholesale trade activities for small firms. For large firms, the authors report figures ranging from 8.6% for retail trade activities to 25.2% in the mining industry. Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Giannetti et al., forthcoming) , our sample includes listed U.S. firms gathered from Compustat, which a priori are less prone to credit rationing, because they have access to the stock market to finance their activities. Moreover, they must comply with information publication rules that limit their opacity. They also tend to be much larger firms. (Petersen and Rajan [1997] report that for 1987, the median total assets of NSSBF firms was a modest $0.13 million; it is $1,900 million in our sample.)
-By focusing on U.S. listed firms, we can use both the change in Altman's (1968 Altman's ( , 2000 Zscore function in two successive years and the firm's long-term abnormal stock performance (i.e., Jensen's alpha from a multifactor asset pricing model; see Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) as proxies of the quality of firm investment projects. The Z-score is particularly relevant because it is the classical indicator used by financial intermediaries to evaluate financial health and performance. If a change in trade credit conveys valuable (private) information to investors about the quality of the firm's investments, we expect the next-period change in the Z-score (i.e., increase) and long-term abnormal returns to be positively associated with the current-period change in trade credit use.
-To control for credit rationing, we include only firms with a Z-score above the median for the population of U.S. listed firms in the final sample. The use of trade credit and Z-score variations also enables us to control for industry-wide factors.
-We select firms for which Gompers et al.'s (2003) governance index and financial analysts' forecasts (from IBES) are available. These requirements allow us to test the predictions relating firm governance, firm opacity, trade credit use, and quality of firm investments.
From our initial sample of 7,801 firm-year observations (i.e., non-financial, U.S., listed firms between 1992 and 2007), our empirical design suggests two samples of 5,466 and 4,475 firm-year observations, depending on the chosen proxy for the quality of firm investment projects. In our multivariate analyses, we use firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, forthcoming) . Our empirical tests deliver a clear result: The use of trade credit clearly conveys information to investors about the quality of firm investments. Without controlling for manager incentives, firm governance mechanisms, or firm opacity, the firm's Z-score increases after a positive change in trade credit, and the firm's long-term abnormal return is positively associated with a change in trade credit. The impact on the firm's Z-score and alpha is economically substantial; doubling the amount purchased on credit (i.e., a 100% increase in trade credit use in one year) leads to a 3.29% increase in the Z-score and a 12-point increase in the Jensen's alpha on a monthly basis (i.e., 1.45% annually).
Managerial incentives and firm governance mechanisms provide the sources of the positive relation between the next-period change in the Z-score and the current-period change in trade credit.
We can confirm the role of firm opacity only for smaller firms in our sample. Furthermore, regarding abnormal stock performance after a change in trade credit, we find that only manager incentives and firm opacity (for small firms) amplify the positive relation between current changes in trade credit and long-term abnormal returns.
This study therefore offers several contributions to our understanding of trade credit use. First, trade credit conveys information to external investors. This finding complements existing financial trade credit theories (e.g., collateral liquidation, supplier market power, input illiquidity, credit rationing theories). Our argument is similar to Biais and Gollier's (1997) signaling model but fundamentally different because (1) we do not assume credit rationing and (2) the information asymmetry occurs between the firm and external investors (not banks and suppliers). According to Biais and Gollier (1997) , the extension of trade credit by suppliers reveals favorable information to other lenders, which then become more willing to lend. Consistent with their theoretical results, Giannetti et al. (forthcoming) show that firms that receive trade credit can secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. However, in our framework, trade credit variations from one period to the next reveal information to outside investors about the quality of the firm's investment projects, which translates into better operational and financial performance.
Second, the use of trade credit relates to manager incentives and firm governance mechanisms, which sheds new light on the role of trade credit as an alternative to standard governance mechanisms.
The manager credibly commits to the pursuit of shareholder interests by selecting a financing mode that limits the use of firm resources for private benefits. This interpretation of the role of trade credit is reminiscent of the role of debt financing as a control mechanism in the agency relationship between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and derives testable empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the empirical design and the data. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
The model
Similar to Fabbri and Menichini (forthcoming), we discuss the trade credit decision from the borrower's perspective. We model the trade credit decision as a strategic game with imperfect information. After we describe agents, actions, and preferences, we introduce the information structure of the game, derive the equilibrium, and finally present the model implications.
Agents, actions, and preferences
We consider four types of agents: managers, investors, suppliers and banks. All are rational and risk neutral. The risk-free rate therefore is normalized to zero. 
where V 0 is the initial market value of the firm and V 1 is its market value after the investment decision, F indicates the manager's private benefits, and y captures the manager's preference for market value maximization.
Investors determine the firm's market value. Because financial markets are efficient, the firm market value is an unbiased estimate of the firm true value (sum of discounted future cash flows), conditional on the information available to investors. Banks and suppliers represent competitive providers of inputs (cash, a perfectly liquid asset, and physical goods, perfectly illiquid assets, respectively 3 ). They are not exposed to bankruptcy risks, nor do they suffer from any form of rationing. They earn therefore the risk-free rate (normalized to 0).
Information structure of the game
The manager type y and the chosen technology are private information that the manager possesses. There is no credible way to communicate y or the chosen technology directly to investors. 4 However, managers, investors, banks, and suppliers share some common information.
Technology. There is only one type of input in the economy, which cannot be stored. Technology
A requires one unit of investment, which generates a value ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ with ∂ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ ‫ݕ߲‬ ⁄ 0, ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ 1 and ሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ 1. Technology B requires α unit of investment with 0 < α < 1, and it generates a value ሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ. This setup indicates the following details: no bankruptcy risk (ሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ 1); the most investment-intensive technology requires only one unit of input; technology A is more value creating than technology B (ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ 1); the more the manager is motivated to maximize the shareholder value, the more technology A is value creating (∂ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ ‫ݕ߲‬ ⁄ 0ሻ 5 and technology B requires less input than technology A (0 < α < 1).
Financing. The manager's financing choice is public information.
Initial firm market value: V 0 is a function of the quality of the firm's governance mechanisms and the degree of firm opacity. We denote G the manager's degree of entrenchment and I as the quality of information about the firm. We assume that ߲ܸ ‫ܩ߲‬ ⁄ 0 [the weaker the firm governance mechanisms, the higher is managerial entrenchment, and the lower is the initial market value of the firm (Gompers et al., 2003) ] and ߲ܸ ‫ܫ߲‬ ⁄ 0 [the better the informational environment of the firm, the higher is its initial market value of the firm (Easley and O'Hara, 2004) ].
Distribution of manager type. Because y is private information to the manager, investors perceive manager type as a random variable and assume a common probability distribution function to y, denoted ϕ.
3 Perfect illiquidity means that the only possible destination of the input is the investment realization. 4 The chosen technology will be revealed in future periods through cash flow realizations. 5 The model can be modified to allow for the manager type y to affect the value creation of technology B. Our conclusions remain unchanged as long as the effect of y on technology A is not inferior to the effect of y on technology B.
Equilibrium analysis
Banks' and suppliers' behavior. Banks and suppliers have no reason to lend less than one unit of input to the firm. They are not credit constrained, and there is no risk that the firm will go bankrupt.
But because it is common knowledge that the most investment-intensive technology requires one unit of input, banks and suppliers also have no reason to lend more than one unit of input (doing so would expose them to bankruptcy risk).
Input diversion. If the manager chooses technology
A, all inputs are invested; there is no input left for private benefits, and F = 0. If the manager chooses technology B, only a fraction α of the input are invested. If the financing source is trade credit, the remaining (1 -α) is an illiquid asset and cannot be diverted. However, if the financing source is bank loans, the remaining (1 -α) is a perfectly liquid asset (cash provided by the banks) and can be diverted for private benefit. We assume at this stage that if the manager chooses technology B, he or she selects bank financing and captures (1 -α) private benefits; in the next section, we show that this assumption is true in equilibrium.
The indifferent manager. Banks' and suppliers' behaviors and input diversion suggest our first lemma: There exists a manager type who is indifferent between technologies A and B. We denote the type of this manager ‫ݕ‬ ො. The indifferent manager type ‫ݕ‬ ො responds to the following condition:
The utility derived from investing in technology A [left side of Equation (2)] is equal to the utility derived from the sum of an investment in technology B and the input diversion [right side of Equation (2)]. The market value of the firm after investment in technology
depends on the investors' valuation (according to information available to them).
Lemma 1: Indifferent manager
The manager of type ‫ݕ‬ ො is indifferent between technologies A and B. Managers of type ‫ݕ‬ ൏ ‫ݕ‬ ො choose technology B, and managers of type ‫ݕ‬ ‫ݕ‬ ො choose technology ‫.ܣ‬ The indifferent type ‫ݕ‬ ො is:
Proof: See Appendix 1. and those who select technology B ‫ݕ(‬ ൏ ‫ݕ‬ ො). These investors therefore value the firm according to:
The market value of the firm after the investment is a weighted average of the market value of the firm obtained under technologies A and B. The weights are the proportions of each manager type in the economy, that is, ߤ ௬ழ௬ ො and ߤ ௬வ௬ ො , both of which can be estimated by investors using ϕ.
If investors can deduce from the financing decision the manager type, they value the firm using With Lemma 1 and investors' valuation behavior, we can derive the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Nash equilibrium
The unique Nash equilibrium of the game is:
(i) Managers with ‫ݕ‬ ൏ ‫ݕ‬ ො choose technology B and use BF.
(ii) Managers with ‫ݕ‬ ‫ݕ‬ ො choose technology A and use TC. In equilibrium, managers who focus more on value creation select technology A and choose TC, because selecting BF would cause them to be evaluated as managers who select technology B.
Managers who place more emphasis on their private benefits select technology B; they also use BF to support their private benefit consumption. Investors, in equilibrium, value the firm according to the financing source chosen, because the correlation of the investment and financing choices enables them to discriminate between the two types of managers.
Implications
From the equilibrium analysis, we can draw four implications, which we summarize in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Implications
According to the assumptions of the model (i.e., absence of bankruptcy risks and financing constraints):
1. Trade credit is positively correlated with firm market value.
2. In the cross-section, an increase in manager incentives reinforces the positive correlation between trade credit and firm market value.
3. In the cross-section, an increase in manager entrenchment reinforces the positive correlation between trade credit and firm market value.
4. In the cross-section, an increase in firm opacity reinforces the positive correlation between trade credit and firm market value.
The simultaneous choice of technology A and TC by manager types ‫ݕ‬ ‫ݕ‬ ො is the source of the positive correlation between firm market value and trade credit financing. These managers do not choose trade credit to signal their quality, but it is in their best interest to invest in technology A and finance their investment by TC. Investors anticipate this behavior and infer their investment choice from their financing source. When managers have greater incentives to maximize firm market value, y is higher.
However, the value creation associated with technology A is increasing in ‫ݕ‬ (∂ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ ‫ݕ߲‬ ⁄ 0); therefore, in the cross-section, greater incentives to maximize firm market value should increase the cross-sectional correlation between firm market value and trade credit use. With greater managerial entrenchment (i.e., weak firm governance mechanisms), the initial firm market value decreases. We show in Appendix 3 that the derivative of ‫ݕ‬ ො, the indifferent manager type, with respect to G, managerial entrenchment, is positive: More entrenched managers favor private benefits. Therefore, the higher G is, the higher must be y to select technology A and TC. Again though, the value creation associated with technology A is increasing in ‫ݕ‬ (∂ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻ ‫ݕ߲‬ ⁄ 0). Consequently, an increase in G reinforces the cross-sectional correlation between the firm's market value and the use of trade credit.
The relation between the firm opacity and the positive correlation between trade credit and firm market value follows the same line of reasoning.
Empirical design and data

Empirical issues
To test Proposition 2, we must address several empirical issues: The investment decisions by firms are not directly observable, particularly those related to internal growth; the use of trade credit is reported in financial statements, which generally are available only annually; managers' private information by definition is not available to the econometrician; Proposition 2 relies on the absence of bankruptcy risk and financing constraints; and trade credit displays a strong industry pattern (see Petersen and Rajan, 1997) . We design our empirical framework to address these issues.
The quality of the firm's investment projects. The implications of Proposition 2 bear on the relation between firm market value and trade credit use. The change in firm market value captures the quality of firm investment projects in the model, whereas in practice, the frequency at which trade credit use is reported makes changes in firm market value extremely noisy proxies for the quality of firm investments. Although trade credit use appears in financial statements, it is difficult to pinpoint with precision the date at which investors gain access to this information. Therefore, if we use market value variations to estimate the effect of trade credit use in terms of information communication, we must compute the change in market value over a longer time horizon while controlling for known risk factors that may affect firm market value.
Therefore, we use Altman's (1968 Altman's ( , 2000 Z-score and the firm's long-run abnormal stock performance as dual proxies for firm performance and the quality of firm investments. Long-term abnormal stock performance corresponds to Jensen's alpha in a multifactor asset pricing model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) computed over a three-year horizon. This first proxy of firm performance enables us to control for known and priced risk factors; however, events unrelated to the change in trade credit use also might affect stock performance over this long horizon, so the alpha is a noisy proxy for the quality of firm investments in the current period. Moreover, long-run abnormal returns may be subject to severe misspecification biases (Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999) .
The Z-score offers alternative advantages. It is widely used by financial institutions as an indicator of financial health and performance, which implies that it serves as a reference indicator for external investors to judge the soundness of the firm's investment policy. The Z-score computation relies mainly on information available in firm financial statements; therefore, we can estimate the Z-score on the same frequency as trade credit use.
Private information. In the model introduced in Section 2, the quality of firm investment projects is private information, and the manager has no credible way to communicate this information directly to external investors (see Section 2.2). Private information by definition is not observable to researchers (in this respect, the econometrician is in the same position as external investors). To tackle this second issue, we relate current trade credit use to the future value of the proxies for the quality of firm investment projects. That is, we relate the Z-score in the next period (t + 1) to trade credit use in the current period (t). The Z-score in period t + 1 is driven by the quality of firm investment projects in period t, and the correlation between trade credit use in period t and the Z-score in period t + 1
indicates the extent to which the use of trade credit in period t reveals information about the quality of firm investment projects in that same period. This forward-looking approach is crucial to our empirical method, because it offers a means to test empirically the predictions of signaling models. The same reasoning applies to Jensen's alpha, which we measure over a period subsequent to the period in which we observe the use of trade credit.
Industry factors. Trade credit reveals a strong industry pattern for which we must control, either by including industry dummies in the multivariate analyses or by analyzing how future changes in the Z-score relate to current changes in the use of trade credit. Industry dummies would prevent us from including firm fixed effects in the regressions (i.e., it is extremely rare that firms change industries from one period to another), so we select the second approach. Working with variations solves the industry factor issue (if industry is constant over time, taking the variations will suppress this factor).
Moreover, because capital structure variables are stable through time (see Lemmon et al., 2008) (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Giannetti et al., forthcoming) .
Yet the use of listed firms is particularly relevant in our case. Listed firms are subject to listing requirements imposed by stock exchanges, which usually pertain to communications to external investors. Their listing guarantees the availability of financial statements to external investors.
Moreover, listed firms are less subject to credit rationing, because they are larger than firms included in the NSSBF database (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and have access to stock markets to finance their investments. The absence of credit rationing is an important assumption for Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 also assumes the absence of bankruptcy risk. To control for this risk, as well as for the use of trade credit in response to financial constraints, we retain only firms with a high Z-score in the final sample. That is, for each year of the sample period, we compare the Z-score of a given firm with the median Z-score of the total U.S. listed firm population, then include only those firms with a Z-score higher than the median. The probability that these firms will go bankrupt in the foreseeable future therefore is extremely low.
Regression specifications
The baseline equation for testing the predictions from Proposition 2 is 6 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
7 One of the Z-score components is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of total debts.
where Quality i,t is the quality of firm i's investment projects at time t, and α t and η i represent year and firm-fixed effects, respectively. Because the quality of firm investment projects is private information at time t, we use two proxies estimated over the subsequent periods for the dependent variable (Quality i,t ): ∆%(Z-score) t,t + 1 , which corresponds to the percentage change in the Z-score for firm i between periods t + 1 and t; and Alpha t + 1,t + 4 , which corresponds to the long-run abnormal returns for firm i between period t + 1 and t + 4. Our implicit assumption is that both the next-period change in the Z-score and the long-run abnormal returns are driven by the quality of firm investments in the current period.
Furthermore, ∆%(Trade credit) t-1,t is the percentage change in trade credit use for firm i between periods t and t -1. Following our predictions in Proposition 2, we expect the firm-specific Determinant i,t variables to have a positive effect on the sensitivity of firm performance (or quality of firm investment projects) to changes in trade credit. These firm-specific variables provide proxies for manager incentives, manager entrenchment, or firm opacity. Consequently, the β 2 coefficient captures the interaction effect between trade credit use and the determinant under investigation, and we can test whether manager incentives, manager entrenchment, or firm opacity amplify the relationship between firm performance (next-period change in Z-score or long-run abnormal returns) and the current-period change in trade credit.
Controls t are industry-adjusted control variables for firm i in period t. Including firm-fixed effects in the regression controls for missing variables that remain constant over time. We also use clustered standard errors for the statistical tests to control for the correlations between firms and time periods (see Petersen, 2009; Thompson, forthcoming) .
Variable definitions
A brief presentation of the variables follows and precise definitions are given in Appendix 4.
Dependent variables. We use two different dependent variables. The first is the percentage change in Z-score between two successive years, derived from Altman's (1968 Altman's ( , 2000 formula:
Z-score = 0.012 X1 + 0.014 X2 + 0.033 X3 + 0.006 X4 + 0.999 X5,
where X1 is working capital divided by total assets, X2 is retained earnings divided by total assets, X3
is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets, X4 is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of total debts, and X5 is total sales divided by total assets.
The second dependent variable is the firm's Jensen's alpha, derived from either a three-factor (Fama and French, 1993) or four-factor (Carhart, 1997) asset pricing model, estimated over a threeyear horizon using monthly returns. 8 The dependent variables in the regressions are the individual firm returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The monthly returns of the factors and the riskfree rate come from Kenneth French's Web site.
Variables of interest.
Trade credit is the ratio of accounts payable to total assets. We construct two proxies for manager incentives using information from Compustat's ExecuComp database: CEO variable compensation, which corresponds to the variable component of the CEO's compensation divided by his or her total salary, and CEO option-based compensation, which equals CEO option awards divided by total salary. We use the governance index (GIM) provided by Gompers et al. (2003) as a proxy for management entrenchment; it measures the strength of corporate governance in a firm by counting the number of charter provisions that insulate management from takeover pressure (e.g., staggered boards, poison pills). A higher value implies more entrenched management (or weaker shareholder rights). Finally, as a proxy for the degree of firm opacity, we use the variable St.Dev. of EPS forecasts, which corresponds to the standard deviation of one-year earnings per share (EPS) growth forecasts by financial analysts.
Control variables.
We include three additional firm-specific control variables: debt ratio, cash ratio, and finished goods inventories ratio. These variables determine trade credit use (see Petersen and Rajan, 1997) , and their omission could raise concerns about missing factors correlated with the main independent variable.
Because financial ratios frequently exhibit large outliers, we winzorize all ratios at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. 8 The use of individual firm alphas, instead of portfolio alphas, enable us to consider firm-specific determinants in Equation (5).
Sample composition
To build our sample, we extract all U.S. listed firms between 1992 and 2007 from the CRSP database. We initiate the analysis in 1992 because ExecuComp's coverage, which we use to compute proxies for manager incentives, begins in 1992. When using the change in Z-score as a proxy for firm In Table 1 We next classify our sample firms according to their size and report the use of trade credit by large and small firms. Large (small) firms own total assets above (below) the sample median total assets (i.e., median total assets of the whole sample of 7,081 firm-year observations in Table 1 Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that firms with higher credit quality (measured by firm size and firm profitability) purchase more on credit.
We provide, in Table 2 , summary statistics for all variables for the whole sample, as well as for the high and low Z-score subsamples. The comparison of the average and median Z-scores indicates that the Z-score distribution is right skewed. The difference in the means of trade credit use by high and low Z-score firms is, as expected in light of Table 1 , highly significant in Table 2 . The average alphas for the whole sample are roughly 8 and 21 basis points (per month over a three-year horizon)
according to the three-and four-factor models, respectively. The difference in means for the alphas between high and low Z-score firms is not significant, which implies that the sampling procedure based on the selection of high Z-scores at time t does not lead to the ex post selection of wellperforming firms. We discuss potential sample selection biases in Section 4.3.
The CEO variable compensation displays a strong right skew (i.e., some CEOs have a very large variable component in their total compensation). We also find a significant difference between high and low Z-score firms from this respect: CEOs of low Z-score firms have a higher variable component in their compensation packages. We observe the same phenomenon when using the option awards to proxy for manager incentives: CEOs of low Z-score firms have more option awards as a proportion of their total compensation than do CEOs of high Z-score firms. Different interpretations stem from these observations. For example, high incentives could encourage risky strategies, reflected in lower ZScores (o.a. by an increase in leverage); high incentives might give CEOs of underperforming firms a motivation to improve the firm's situation; underperforming firms also might be forced to propose high incentive packages to attract good CEOs; or CEO incentives may fail to improve performance.
The firm governance structure (GIM) does not appear different between high and low Z-score firms. However, low Z-score firms are clearly more opaque than high Z-score firms. The financial analysts' forecasts of one-year EPS (St.Dev. of EPS forecasts) is more dispersed for low than for high Z-score firms. Finally, our three control variables behave differently between the high and low Z-score subsamples: Low Z-score firms are more indebted, possess more cash, and carry lower finished goods inventories.
Results
We report our multivariate analyses in three tables: Table 3 uses the percentage change in Z-score as the dependent variable, and Tables 4 and 5 uses the alphas from the three-and four-factor models, respectively.
Z-Score
The six columns of Table 3 provide direct tests of Proposition 2 (see Section 3.2 for the regression specification). We report the p-values in parentheses under the coefficient estimates, obtained using clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, forthcoming) . All specifications include firm and year dummies.
In Panel A of Table 3 , we focus on the high Z-score firm subsample, which includes 5,466 firmyear observations. The firms presumably are not credit rationed and not threatened by the risk of Furthermore, when CEO entrenchment (GIM) is higher, the relationship again is stronger, in support of the third prediction of Proposition 2. The effect of firm opacity is not statistically significant though. We confirm these results in the last column, in which we simultaneously include the four interaction variables together with three control variables (debt ratio, cash ratio, and inventories ratio).
Financial debts and cash both relate positively to the next-period change in the Z-score.
Therefore, Panel A of Table 3 reveals that, consistent with our model prediction, the marginal effect of the current-period change in trade credit use on the next-period change in Z-score is positive and statistically significant in all specifications, except the last column (p-value = 0.11).
We replicate these findings in Panel B of Table 3 with the subsample of 3,901 firm-year observations from small firms that have high Z-scores. 9 However, we note one exception in this case:
the coefficient of the interaction variable between St.Dev. of EPS forecasts and the current-period change in trade credit use is significant, with a p-value of 0.05. Therefore, firm opacity reinforces the information content of trade credit use for smaller firms.
The marginal effect of the change in trade credit use is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in all columns in Panel B of Table 3 . We therefore may conclude from the results in Table 3 that trade credit use by financially healthy firms conveys valuable information to outside investors, especially when standard governance mechanisms are weak and the firm is more opaque. By using trade credit as a source of financing that limits diversion opportunities, the CEO commits to acting in the best interest of shareholders.
From an economic point of view, the sensitivity of the change in the Z-score to the change in trade credit use is substantial. Doubling the amount purchased on account (i.e., a percentage increase of 100%) leads to a percentage increase in the next-period Z-score by 3.29% for high Z-score firms and 2.45% for small firms among the high Z-score firms.
Long-run stock performance
The results in Tables 4 and 5 replicate those in Table 3 but use the alphas from three-and fourfactor models, respectively, as the dependent variable. In both tables, the estimation in the first column indicates that the current year change in trade credit use has a positive and significant impact on the alphas.
Regarding the potential determinants of the alpha sensitivity to trade credit change, only the CEO's variable compensation is significant for the high Z-score firms in Panel A of Table 4 . For the smaller firms among these high Z-score firms (Panel B, Table 4 ), both variable compensation and the deviation in EPS forecasts amplify the effect of changes in trade credit on the alpha significantly. For the four-factor model in Table 5 , only the EPS forecasts variable for smaller firms has a marginally significant impact, with a p-value of 0.10.
Consistent with the first prediction of Proposition 2, the marginal effects of the change in trade credit use are positive (ranging between 8 and 15 basis points monthly) and highly significant in all specifications and for both panels in Tables 4 and 5 . The effect also is economically substantial.
Doubling the amount purchased on account leads to a monthly abnormal stock performance of 12 basis points for high Z-score firms and 15 basis points for smaller, high Z-score firms (see the first columns in Tables 4 and 5 ). These performance effects translate into 1.45% and 1.81% abnormal returns on a yearly basis, respectively.
Additional checks and results
Potential sample selection bias. We perform some additional checks to demonstrate that our results are not driven by potential sample selection bias. Our sampling procedure based on the Z-score might generate a sample selection bias because the Z-score also serves as a proxy for the quality of firm investments. However, the sample selection procedure, which ranks firms into high and low Zscore subsamples, is based on information available at time t, whereas the performance based on the Z-score is measured at time t + 1. Moreover, we use the percentage change in Z-score, not the Z-score as such, to measure performance.
Sample selection bias still might be at play if the current-period Z-score and next-period change in Z-score correlate positively. To assess whether the results are driven by the inclusion of only high Zscore firms in the final sample, we analyze the relationship between the next-period percentage change in the Z-score and the current-period Z-score (see Table 6 ). The relationship is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that the likelihood of observing a decrease in the Z-score is more substantial for high Z-score firms (i.e., mean reversion phenomenon) than for low Z-score firms.
If sample selection bias exists, it actually plays against our observation of improved Z-scores in the next period.
Finally, we already mentioned in Section 3.4 that the difference in the means for the alphas between high and low Z-score firms is not significant (see Table 2 ). This result provides a further indication that the sampling procedure, based on high Z-scores at time t, does not lead to the ex post selection of better performing firms on average.
Bankruptcy risk. We derive our theoretical model under the assumption of no bankruptcy risk; we therefore investigate whether not controlling for bankruptcy risk in the empirical design affects our results. In Table 7 , we replicate the analysis in Tables 3-5 for the whole sample of 7,801 firm-year observations, without controlling for bankruptcy risk (i.e., no restriction to high Z-score firms). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the next-period percentage change in the Z-score, and in Panel B, it is the alpha from a four-factor model. Table 7 indicates that the alpha from a four-factor model is marginally and positively related to the change in trade credit use (p = 0.11). Of the determinants of the sensitivity of the alpha to the change in trade credit use, only the CEO's variable compensation is significant and with the expected sign. These regression results demonstrate that it is important to control for bankruptcy risk to test our model predictions.
Conclusion
The use of trade credit by financially unconstrained firms may alleviate information asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Our theoretical model predicts a positive relation between the use of trade credit and firm value, which should be even stronger for (1) firms with economically motivated CEOs, (2) firms with poorer corporate governance structures, and (3) more opaque firms.
Our theoretical predictions receive support from our data. We design an empirical study to address the challenges of testing predictions based on private information and controlling for credit rationing and bankruptcy risk arguments. Using a large sample of U.S. listed firms during 1992-2007, we provide evidence that the use of trade credit reveals valuable information to outside investors. Both the change in Z-score and the firm's long-run abnormal returns relate positively to the use of trade credit.
We also confirm the effects of CEO contract and corporate governance structures when we use the next-period change in Z-score as a proxy for the quality of firm investment decisions. Firm opacity plays a role for smaller firms only.
Appendix 1:Indifferent manager type ෝ (lemma 1)
The indifferent manager type ‫ݕ‬ ො satisfies condition (A.1):
From Equation (A.1), we can write:
We also note that o If they choose ‫,ܤ(‬ ‫,)ܥܶ‬ they get ሺߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ െ ܸ ሻ ௬ , which is equal to their equilibrium payoff (i.e., the remaining inputs are illiquid).
o If they choose ‫,ܤ(‬ ‫,)ܨܤ‬ they get ሺܸ ത ሻ ௬ ሺ1 ሺ1 െ ߙሻሻ, which is inferior to ሺߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ െ ܸ ሻ ௬ , because ‫ݕ‬ ‫ݕ‬ ො.
-Investors:
o Given that, in equilibrium, the choice of financing source is informative, the efficient valuation is ߚሺ‫ݕ‬ሻሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ for firms financed by TC and ሺܸ ത ܸ ሻ for firms financed by BF.
2. If it is the unique Nash equilibrium, the analysis is straightforward once the proposition one has been established. ii. ‫ݕ‬ ൏ ‫ݕ‬ ො: ሺߚܸ ത െ ܸ ሻ ௬ , which is below ሺܸ ത ሻ ௬ ሺ1 ሺ1 െ ߙሻሻ, by definition of ‫ݕ‬ ො.
Appendix 3: Sign of the derivative of ෝ (indifferent manager type) with respect to ( managerial entrenchment) Altman's (1968 Altman's ( , 2000 formula: Z-score = 0.012 X1 + 0.014 X2 + 0.033 X3 + 0.006 X4 + 0.999 X5, where is working capital (item4 minus item 5) divided by total assets (item6), is retained earnings (item36) divided by total assets, is earnings before interest and taxes (item13 minus item14) divided by total assets, is the ratio of market value of equity (item25 times item199) to the book value of total debts (item6 minus item60) and is total sales (item12) divided by total assets.
∆%(Z-score) t,t + 1
Percentage change in Z-score between time t and t + 1:
Alpha
Jensen's alpha computed at the individual firm level, either from a threefactor (Fama and French, 1993) or four-factor (Carhart, 1997) model, estimated over a three-year horizon (t + 1 to t + 4) using monthly returns. The dependent variables are the individual firm returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The monthly returns of the factors (size, book-to-market, and market excess returns [Fama and French, 1993] and momentum factor [Carhart, 1997] ) and the risk-free rate are from Kenneth French's Web site.
CEO variable compensation
Total salary (field TDC2 in ExecuComp) minus base salary (field SALARY in ExecuComp) divided by total salary. CEO option-based compensation CEO option awards divided by the CEO total compensation (field TDC2 in ExecuComp)
GIM index
Proxy for the firm's corporate governance quality, based on Gompers et al.'s (2003) index, which is constructed using information from the IRRC database. Higher index levels correspond to more managerial power. In the multivariate analyses, we use a dummy version of this variable (1 = GIM index above the sample median; 0 otherwise).
St.Dev. of EPS forecasts
Standard deviation of the one-year earnings per share growth forecasts by financial analysts; data from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database.
Debt ratio Long-term debt (item9) plus current liabilities (item34) divided by total assets (item6).
Cash ratio Cash and short-term investments (item1) divided by total assets (item6)
Inventories ratio Finished goods inventories (item78) divided by total inventories (item3).
Notes: Compustat is the source of items identified by numbers. Trade credit corresponds to accounts payable divided by total assets. We report the average trade credit (percentage) for the whole sample, large firms, small firms, and firms with high and low Z-scores. Large (small) firms are firms with total assets above (below) the median total assets; high (low) Z-score firms have Z-scores above (below) the median Zscore. N equals the number of firms.
N
Whole sample
Large firms
Small firms
High Z-score firms Trade credit use is measured using the accounts payable to total assets ratio. ∆%(Trade credit) t-1,t corresponds to the percentage change in trade credit use between year t and year t -1. Variable definitions are in Appendix 4. P-values are computed using clustered standard errors and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. N denotes the number of observations. R² and F-Statistic denote the R-square and the Fisher statistic for the regression, respectively. For specifications 2-6, the marginal effect of the change in trade credit on the next-period change in Z-score is reported; it corresponds to the partial derivative estimated using the average value of the corresponding control variables. The dependent variable is the alpha from Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, estimated using monthly data between year t + 1 and year t + 4. Trade credit use is measured using the accounts payable to total assets ratio. ∆%(Trade credit) t-1,t corresponds to the change in trade credit use between year t and year t -1. Variable definitions are in Appendix 4. P-values are computed using clustered standard errors and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. N denotes the number of observations. R² and F-Statistic denote the R-square and the Fisher statistic for the regression, respectively. For specifications 2-6, the marginal effect of the change in trade credit on the firm's alpha is also reported; it corresponds to the partial derivative estimated using the average value of the corresponding control variables. The dependent variable is the alpha from Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, estimated using monthly data between year t + 1 and year t + 4. Trade credit use is measured using the accounts payable to total assets ratio. ∆%(Trade credit) t-1,t corresponds to the change in trade credit use between year t and year t -1. Variable definitions are in Appendix 4. P-values are computed using clustered standard errors and reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. N denotes the number of observations. R² and F-Statistic denote the R-square and the Fisher statistic for the regression, respectively. For specifications 2-6, the marginal effect of the change in trade credit on the firm's alpha is also reported; it corresponds to the partial derivative estimated using the average value of the corresponding control variables. 
